Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

2014

Institutional Theories and International Development
Nicole Hassoun
Binghamton University--SUNY, nhassoun@binghamton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Hassoun, Nicole, "Institutional Theories and International Development" (2014). Philosophy Faculty
Scholarship. 11.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at The Open Repository @ Binghamton
(The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

Institutional Theories
NICOLE
HASSOUN and International
Development
Abstract:A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’.
In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so
innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional
quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts and other
aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical introduction to
some of the literature on institutional quality. It looks, in particular, at an argument
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will
promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there is little
theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor.
Keywords: Institutions, Aid, Conditionality, International Development
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Introduction
A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’.
In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so
innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional
quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts
and other aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical
introduction to some of this literature. It looks, in particular, at an argument
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality
will promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there
is little theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is
good for the poor. It also raises what may be a general problem for theoretical
economic arguments based on posited incentive effects. Such arguments
require empirical substantiation (which many argue requires some previously
substantiated theoretical framework). In making its case, this paper has
the subsidiary aim of showing how philosophers can contribute to a largely
neglected area of study. Most work in the philosophy of economics looks at the
foundations of game theory and welfare economics. Philosophers have paid
very little attention to public and development economics.1 There are many
important policy arguments that desperately require analytic examination of the
sort philosophers are well placed to offer.2 The next section explains the kind of
1	There are, of course, some exceptions. See, for instance, Gillian Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Nicole Hassoun, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance,
Expanding Obligations (Cambridge University Press: 2012); Leif Wenar, ‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 36/1 (2008), 2-32. For discussion of philosophical work in the public economics literature
see, for instance, Subbu Subramanian, ‘Counting the Poor: An Elementary Difficulty in the Measurement of Poverty’,
Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002), 277-85.
2 For examples, see ibid.
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international development at issue in this paper and motivates the inquiry into
New Institutional arguments about international aid. The section ‘Theoretical
Arguments for Conditionality: Moral Hazard’ considers the main theoretical
argument for making aid conditional on institutional quality. The section ‘The
Empirical Evidence and Critique’ considers the empirical evidence that might
support such conditionality. The last section concludes.
New Institutionalism and International Aid
There is no single definition of international development in the literature, but
it is almost uncontroversial to suppose that whatever else good development
requires, it requires poverty reduction.3 Perhaps one of the most comprehensive
practical accounts of international development is embodied in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs have served to coordinate the efforts of
many different actors and provide one broadly compelling picture of what good
development requires (or at least some conditions for good development). The
first MDG is to reduce poverty. In recent discussions of, and resolutions regarding,
the global development agenda post-2015, poverty reduction remains a clear
focus.4 So, this paper will assume that good development is not just a matter of
fostering growth. Rather, good development (and international aid that promotes
development) should, at a minimum, help the poor. A lot of the philosophical
work on international development would support this contention.5
Similarly, when one pays attention to the details of the regressions in economists’
empirical studies, it is clear that they contain many different and inconsistent
(implicit) definitions of ‘institutional quality’. Some focus on relatively stable
features of countries that persist over time and others focus more on the
current policy environment. A cynic might even suggest that the ‘new’ focus on
institutional quality is not new at all. Rather it allows economists to repackage
old results under a new label – looking at ‘good’ policies like trade liberalization,
3	
Further, there is reason to believe that aiding countries and institutions are often committed to reducing poverty
with their aid. The World Bank, for instance, bills itself as an institution deeply concerned about poverty and does not
articulate or defend an alternate moral framework. The Bank says: ‘Our mission is to fight poverty with passion and
professionalism for lasting results and to help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources,
sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors’ (World Bank, ‘About
Us’, [2013], http://www.worldbank.org/en/about [accessed 20 August 2013]). The International Development
Association (IDA) website says: ‘The International Development Association (IDA) is the World Bank’s fund for the
poorest countries’ (IDA, ‘What is IDA?’, [2013], http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ [accessed 20 June 2013]).
4	United Nations, ‘United Nations A/RES/65/1’, (October 19, 2010), www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/outcome_
documentN1051260.pdf (accessed 20 June 2013).
5	Peter Singer, ‘Famine Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1/1 (1972), 229-43; Onora O’Neill,
Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice and Development (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Amartya Sen,
Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:
The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Thomas Pogge, ‘Severe Poverty as a
Human Rights Violation’, in Thomas Pogge (ed.) Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to
the Very Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11-53; David Crocker, The Ethics of Global Development:
Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (7) 2014

13

INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

corruption, and so forth and then calling these ‘institutions’ and concluding that
good institutions are important. This paper will, thus, suppose that institutional
quality is a cluster concept and pay attention to the details of each study which
argues that it is important to give aid to countries with good institutions.
Despite the fact that there are different conceptions of institutional quality in
the literature, the new focus on institutional quality’s impact on aid may have
a large impact on international development via its impact on poverty (and
perhaps other things). Many countries and international institutions, including
the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), the United Kingdom, and
Canada use formulas for distributing aid that take into account institutional
quality.6 More precisely, many states and international institutions use algorithms
governing the amount of aid they offer to different countries that include some
version of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) index – a measure of institutional quality.7 Some of these measures are
quite complicated but many, like the CPIA, consider countries’ economic,
structural, social, and public sector policies (see the Appendix for further
explanation of the CPIA, in particular). Consider the potential impact of World
Bank aid alone. The International Development Association (IDA) is the part of
the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest people, 1.5 billion of whom live on
less than the equivalent of $2 a day. In 2008, the IDA gave Official Development
Assistance (ODA) worth 6,689.24 million.8 It provides basic health services,
primary education, clean water and sanitation, environmental protection,
business support, infrastructure, and help with institutional reforms.9 So it
really matters how this institution distributes its aid. Insofar as the concern is to
6	
African Development Bank, ‘2009 Country Policy and Institutional Assessments Questionnaire’, (2009), www.
afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2009%20CPIA%20Questionnaire%20
%28English%29%20%28Rev%20%29%20-%20Oct%2019%202009-1.pdf (accessed 26 August 2013); Finn Tarp, ‘Aid
and Development’, Swedish Economic Policy Review 13 (2006), 9-61.
7	Over time the CPIA has changed slightly. It used to contain 20 indicators. See, for instance, Ravi Kanbur, ‘Reforming
the Formula: A Modest Proposal for Introducing Development Outcomes in IDA Allocation Procedures’, Cornell
University Working Paper (2005), www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/IDAForm.pdf (accessed 20 June 2013).
Other changes to the formula include the fact that capital account convertability and privatization are no longer
included in the guidelines for good policy; see Adam Minson, ‘Dialogue on the CPIA and Aid Allocation’, The Initiative
for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series, (2007), Ms.
8	OECD, ‘Aid Statistics’, (2010), www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ (accessed 15 July 2013). There are many different measures
of poverty and I discuss some different proxies below. For some work on standard measures of income poverty, see
Subramanian (2002); Nicole Hassoun and Subbu Subramanian, ‘On Some Problems of Variable Population Poverty
Comparisons’, UNU WIDER Working Paper 2010/71 (2010), http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/workingpapers/2010/en_GB/wp2010-71/ (accessed 13 May 2013).
9	Unlike other ‘aid’, ODA does not include military aid. Rather ODA primarily includes grants and loans to developing
countries. Here is the official definition: ‘Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with
a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise
contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral
institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. Lending by
export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export promotion—is excluded’) International Monetary Fund [IMF],
‘External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users – Appendix III – Glossary’, [2003], www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/eds/Eng/Guide/index.htm [accessed 19 March 2013]).
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reduce poverty, it is important to consider whether or not it is a good idea to make
aid conditional on good institutional quality.
Perhaps one could argue that the debate about making aid conditional on good
institutional quality is purely academic for one of two reasons. First, even those
international institutions and states that use a metric for allocating aid that takes
into account institutional quality often fail to actually implement these rules
consistently. The IDA, for instance, makes many exceptions – e.g., it gives more
aid to small island states and post-conflict countries than they should receive
on its metric. Second, if aid were allocated according to these metrics, many
international institutions and states giving aid would actually give more aid to
poorer countries.
The graph below illustrates how disbursements according to the IDA allocation
formula would be much more highly correlated with other proxies for poverty
than actual IDA allocations or ODA in general.10

Figure 1: Author’s Calculations of Correlation between IDA rule, IDA allocation, ODA allocation, and
Other Proxies for Poverty

10	
The official definition of ODA is ‘Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA
Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with
promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan,
having a grant element of at least 25 percent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid.
Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g., pensions,
reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted’) OECD, ‘Official Development Assistance – Definition
and Coverage’, [2013], http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm
[accessed 25 April 2013]).
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If the IDA’s rule for allocating aid were actually implemented, it would ensure
that aid goes to poorer countries on many metrics for poverty. Looking at a
sample of 35 countries for which data is easily available, it is clear that estimated
disbursements according to the IDA allocation rule would be highly correlated
with child mortality, malnutrition, lack of primary education, and adult illiteracy
rates as well as poverty rates.11
It is not clear, however, that allocation rules’ justifications are unimportant
– the IDA’s rule, for instance, does seem to govern the disbursement of much
international aid. Moreover, the correlation between poverty (etc.) and
disbursements according to allocation rules in no way justifies these rules.
Giving aid in these ways may still do little to alleviate poverty or secure
international development. There may be other rules that would be better for
achieving this objective. Just like giving money to someone who is sick or who
is doing poorly in school might not be the best way to help them get better or
improve their grades, giving aid to poor countries may not be the best way to
help them reduce poverty. At least this correlation cannot justify any kind of
institutionalism.12 So it is worth seeing if, taking into account the incentives
aid creates, a case can be made for making aid conditional on good institutional
quality.
The rest of this paper suggests that, insofar as aid is supposed to relieve poverty,
there is little reason to believe we should make aid conditional on good institutional
quality. The next section considers the main theoretical argument put forward for
using aid allocation metrics that put a lot of emphasis on institutional quality.
The fourth section turns to some of the evidence regarding the impact on poverty
of making aid conditional on good institutional quality.
Theoretical Arguments for Conditionality: Moral Hazard
Perhaps the best theoretical argument for making aid conditional on good
institutional quality is the moral hazard argument. There are many different
version of the moral hazard argument that posit different mechanisms by which
giving aid on the basis of poverty alone creates potentially counter-productive
incentives. It is only necessary to consider, however, a version that the IDA seems
to embrace when it says: ‘While it is natural to focus on how the allocation formula
distributes aid across poor countries, it should be kept in mind that it also affects
11	Author’s calculations using the 2004 IDA disbursement formula and looking just at the subset of countries for which
data was available from the following sources: Bob Baulch, ‘Aid Distribution and the MDGs’, World Development 34/6
(2006), 933-50; United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Report 2010’, (2010), http://hdr.
undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf (accessed 15 May 2013).
12	Moreover, this correlation may not be enough to justify any of these rules. Giving to the poorest countries, on any of
these measures, might not be the best way to reduce poverty for reasons other than the idea that we have to take into
account institutional quality to reduce poverty.
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how poor countries are treated over time. The negative coefficient on per capita
GNI (Gross National Income) is essentially a tax on growth’.13 The problem this
paper will suggest moral hazard arguments have is quite general – empirical
evidence is necessary to support their claims about incentives.
In the moral hazard argument at issue, the main claim is not that if we give
to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor, rulers will keep their
countries poor. The claim is that if we give to countries that are poor, simply
because they are poor, we create an incentive for rulers to keep their countries
poor. An incentive, at least as most economists use the term, just provides a reason
for action. An incentive is like a reward or penalty. Rewards or penalties may or
may not be efficacious. Sometimes incentives do not work. Nevertheless, many
incentives have motivational force. The version of the moral hazard argument
above says that if we give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor,
we give rulers a reason to keep their countries poor – they can get more aid. So we
should not just give to poor countries, we should instead give to poor countries
that have good policies.
Consider an analogy that illustrates the problem with this argument – a variation
of philosopher Peter Singer’s famous pond case. Suppose that, on your way to
work, you see a small child is drowning in a pond. You can save the child by a
process that involves giving the child’s mother one hundred dollars. Even though
it will cost you something to do so, if no one else can help the child and the child
will otherwise drown, it is clear that you should save the child. Some have pointed
out that if you save the child, you create incentives for mothers of small children
to throw their children into ponds. The proper reply to this kind of case is that
there is no reason to think other mothers (generally) will throw their children in
ponds for one hundred dollars even in places where one hundred dollars is a lot
of money. Sometimes, we should (simply) aim to ameliorate poverty even if we
create bad incentives in the process.
The moral hazard argument may not always be dismissed so easily. In some
cases, there may be reason to think many mothers will do things to harm
their children if we create incentives for them to do so. After all, some parents
probably do maim their children so as to make them better beggars.14 It is less
clear that this is because people will help those who are maimed. This may not
13	IDA, ‘IDA 14: IDA’s Performance Based Allocation’, (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/
PBAIDA14.pdf (accessed 7 June 2013), p. 7. The IDA actually tries to give poverty some weight in its allocation rule in
this way but the general point is that if we give to poorer countries aid, it will be negatively correlated with growth and
thus create a disincentive for growth. For criticism of the IDA’s attempt to take into account poverty in the way that
it does, see Nicole Hassoun, ‘World Bank Rules for Aid Allocation: Moral Hazard?’ in Helen Stacy and Win-chiat Lee
(eds.), Economic Justice (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012b), 221-41.
14	The moral import of this observation is less clear.
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be the best explanation of why mothers might harm their children. A better
explanation is that mothers maim their children only because they do not have a
better means for helping their families survive.
In any case, the claim that we should not create incentives for some to keep
others in poverty requires defense. Consider an expansion of the (first part of the
relevant version of) the moral hazard argument:
P1) If we give to countries that are poor, simply because they are poor,
we create an incentive for their rulers to keep them poor.
P2) We should not create an incentive for rulers to keep their countries
poor.
C) We should not give to countries that are poor, simply because they
are poor.
The complaint is that we need some reason to accept the second premise,
for it is not always true. Rulers may not act on the incentive aid creates. Giving
to countries with good institutions may not increase growth or spur poverty
reduction.
More generally, we may be wrong about the efficacy of any posited incentive
effect. Other incentive effects may be present and counter the posited effect or the
posited effect may fail to generate action. Consider an example from a different
domain. Many people believe that decreasing what people are paid gives them
an incentive to work less hard. Few seem to recognize, however, that decreasing
what people are paid also gives them an incentive to work harder (to make up
for lost income).15 If some people need very little money (e.g., because they are
primarily sustenance farmers), decreasing what they are paid may not influence
their behavior at all.
Another problem with many versions of the moral hazard argument is this:
Even if aiding on the basis of poverty alone creates some efficacious incentives
for rulers to keep their countries poor, we may still have to aid on the basis of
poverty alone in some circumstances. Suppose that some countries will not
escape poverty on their own and aid may do them very little good. Their leaders
may keep them poor in order to receive more aid. Suppose, further, that there is
no other way to aid. It may, for instance, be impossible to tell which countries will
continue to support themselves after receiving aid and which will remain poor.
Further, there may be very few countries that will remain poor and many that
will escape poverty permanently. In this kind of case, it is not clearly acceptable
15	For an exception, see Robert Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1988).
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to stop giving aid. We may have to give aid even if aid creates some efficacious
incentives for some rulers to keep their countries poor.
Nevertheless, there may be something important underlying the moral hazard
argument. Consider just one revised version of this argument that avoids the
problems outlined above: Giving on the basis of poverty alone creates an efficacious
incentive for rulers to keep their countries poor. When we justifiably have some
concern for how much poverty we alleviate (etc.), other criteria should enter into
our decisions about how to aid.16 This argument is much more promising than the
original moral hazard argument because it appeals only to efficacious incentive
effects. Further, it does not rely on the controversial claim that we need never aid
desperately poor countries when some will remain poor because of the incentives
aid creates.
Even the revised version of the moral hazard argument gives nothing like the
kind of justification necessary for distributing aid only to countries with good
institutional quality. For the revised version of the moral hazard argument to
be well-justified, the premise that aiding on the basis of poverty alone creates an
efficacious incentive for rulers to keep their countries poor requires empirical
defense.17
Finally, even if some of the negative incentives aid creates do drive behavior,
what we should do about that is still an open question. Even if giving aid to poor
16	This may be so, for instance, if resources are so scarce that we are unable to eliminate poverty and do all of the other
things that matter. This is not clearly the case in the actual world, however. For, (1) we give very little aid globally and
(2) we know a lot about what makes aid work. It is well-known that most countries fall far short of the target of .7
percent of GDP in foreign aid (OECD, ‘Development Aid at its Highest Level Ever in 2008’, [2008], www.oecd.org/do
cument/35/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42458595_1_1_1_1,00.html [accessed on 28 June 2013]). On average, citizens
in OECD-DAC countries gave $68 in 2002 (OECD [2004] cited in Tarp [2006], p. 14). Furthermore, there is a lot of
good evidence that some aid works. There are many experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of health and
education programs, for instance, that demonstrate their success. There are also good examples of agricultural support,
microfinance, school voucher, scholarship, and de-worming programs. See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley
Yin, ‘Female Empowerment: Impact of a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines’, World Development, 38/3
(2010), 333-344; Robert Cassen, Does Aid Work? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan,
and Lant Pritchett, ‘Does Participation Improve Project Performance: Establishing Causality with Subjective Data’,
The World Bank Economic Review 9/2 (1995), 175-200; Al Kehler, ‘When Will Ethiopia Stop Asking for Food Aid?’, in
Humanitarian Policy Group (ed.), Humanitarian Exchange. Humanitarian Policy Group No. 27 (London: Overseas
Development Institute, 2004), 22-4; Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, ‘Using Randomization
in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit’, Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper 6059 (2007).
Many of these programs have been successfully replicated and scaled up (Duflo et al. [2007]; Hassan Zaman,
‘Poverty and BRAC’s Microcredit Programme: Exploring Some Linkages’, BRAC Working Paper Number 18 [1997];
Jonathan Morduch, ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’,
Harvard University Department of Economics and HIID Working Paper [1998] http://www.cgdev.org/doc/RM/
Morduch%201998,%20Does%20Microfinance%20Really%20Help%20the%20Poor--New%20Evidence%20
from%20Flagship%20Programs%20in%20Bangladesh.pdf [accessed 16 July 2013]; Mark Pitt, ‘Reply to Jonathan
Morduch’s ‘Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh’, Ms.,
http://www.brown.edu/research/projects/pitt/sites/brown.edu.research.projects.pitt/files/uploads/reply_0.pdf
[accessed 20 August 2013]). Though it may not be easy to do so, it is clearly possible to create such programs.
17	There may be other arguments for considering other factors besides development or poverty in aid allocation. We might
be concerned, for instance, about how fast we can alleviate poverty. This paper will not explore other possibilities. See,
however, Deen Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Hassoun
and Subramanian (2010).
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countries on the basis of poverty alone creates an efficacious incentive for their
rulers to keep them poor and concern with how much poverty we alleviate (etc.)
is justified, it does not follow that we should give to those countries with good
institutions. For it is possible that giving to countries with good institutions would
be no better, or even worse, for the poor than giving on the basis of poverty alone.
It is time to turn to the empirical evidence for the conclusion that institutional
quality matters. If it is not sustainable, there is reason to endorse a different
theoretical framework in the search for reflective equilibrium between theory and
practice. Before considering this evidence, it is worth noting that the problem with
the moral hazard argument may be a general problem for theoretical economic
arguments based on posited incentive effects. Such arguments require empirical
substantiation.18
The Empirical Evidence and Critique
Before considering more sophisticated empirical arguments, consider why we
cannot conclude that we should make aid conditional on countries having good
institutions because institutions are good for poverty reduction.19 Most of the
literature on the importance of institutional quality focuses on establishing
that good institutions foster growth.20 But we cannot rely on estimates of how
much growth, in general, reduces poverty to bridge the gap in figuring out how
institutions impact poverty (even if they increase growth). Not all causes of growth
will reduce poverty by the same amount – some may even increase poverty.21
18	
Some argue that this requires some previously substantiated theoretical framework. See for instance,, Angus Deaton,
‘Instruments of Development: Randomization in the Tropics, and the Search for the Elusive Keys to Economic
Development’, NBER Working Paper 14690 (2009), www.econ.uiuc.edu/~roger/courses/574/readings/Deaton_
Instruments%20of%20development.pdf (accessed 16 April 2013).
19	For some seminal work in New Institutional Economics see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). In this book North argues that institutions are
incredibly important for international development as they help create order and reduce transaction costs. However,
he provides no empirical evidence to make his case. North instead surveys the history of economic development in
several countries and gives informal game-theoretic arguments. Although North’s article opened the door to empirical
research on this important topic, it does little on its own to establish his empirical conclusions about the importance
of goods institutions.
20	One key paper supporting the institutional thesis popularized, in part, by Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson’s book
Why Nations Fail (New York: Crown Business Publishing, 2012), is Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James
Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development’, The American Economic Review 91 (2001), 1369–401.
In this paper, Acemoglu et al. implemented (a now widely used method) of dealing with what economists call an
‘endogeneity’ problem – roughly, the problem that arises when we do not take into account the impact of reverse
causation. One way to deal with this problem is to introduce an ‘instrument’ – something that is correlated with the
right-hand side variable (the hypothesized causal factor – in this case institutional quality) - but should be independent
of the left-hand side variable (that is of interest – here, growth). In order to identify the instrument for the quality of
institutions, Acemoglu et al. look at differences in settler mortality during colonial time. It seems, however, that more
than a modicum of faith is necessary to accept arguments based on this instrument for institutional quality. Acemoglu
et al.’s instrument might be good for colonialism (or successful colonialism) but it does not clearly capture any kind of
institutional quality.
21	
Fernando Teson, ‘When Philosophers Misdiagnose’, Analysis 74/1 (2014), 107-18. There may also be another problem
with the literature on institutional quality. The proposition that ‘institutions matter’ is compelling (who would doubt
this? – especially if, as Teson suggests, ‘[g]ood governance may be roughly defined as the traditions and institutions
by which authority in a country is exercised to the benefit of its citizens’) (Teson [2014], p. 112). Nevertheless, when
one pays attention to the details of the regressions in economists’ empirical studies, it is clear that they contain many
different and inconsistent (implicit) definitions of institutional quality.
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A few papers do look at the impact of institutional quality on poverty specifically.22
However, the evidence that good institutions are good for poverty reduction may
have some problems in dealing with reverse causality.23
Moreover, even if the claim that good institutions are good for poverty reduction
is correct, further evidence is necessary to establish that aiding countries with
good institutions will ameliorate poverty. Even if aid improves institutional
quality, some causes of institutional improvement may not contribute to poverty
relief. Alternately, aid may not improve, it may even destroy, good institutions.24
Mathias Risse might be right when he says that ‘the sources of wealth rest in
[domestic] institutional quality… . While foreigners can destroy institutions, they
can often do little to help build them’.25 The general form of argument – x reduces
poverty so we should give to countries with x – is not a good one. It is important
to consider whether countries, or international institutions, offering aid might do
better to target it in other ways.26 We need to know whether aid has more impact
in countries with good institutional quality.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that might support the claim that
‘among low-income countries, large-scale financial aid has more impact in an
environment of sound institutions and policies’.27 Perhaps the seminal article on
the topic is ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’ (first put out as a working paper in 1997)
by Burnside and Dollar. This paper argues that aid works only in countries with
‘good policies’ using a measure of policy quality that contains budget surplus,
trade openness and inflation weighted by their correlation with growth rates.28
22	
See, for instance, Omar Azfar, ‘Institutions and Poverty Reduction’, Center for Institutional Reform and the
Informal Sector (IRIS), University of Maryland, College Park, (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPGI/
Resources/342674-1115051862644/Institutions8.pdf (accessed 23 April 2013).
23	In the paper cited above, for instance, institutional quality is not a significant predictor of growth on the standard
instrument for institutional quality (moreover, I do not find this instrumentation strategy compelling – see discussion
in notes below).
24	
Aid may help countries with bad institutions improve their institutions and reduce poverty
25	
Mathias Risse, ‘Do We Owe the Poor Assistance or Rectification?’ Ethics & International Affairs 19/1 (2005), 9-18.
26	Even if the institutionalist thesis is true, it is so vague as to be unhelpful. It is not clear what components of institutional
quality as measured by the CPIA index, for instance, are contributing to aid’s success (see Dani Rodrik, ‘Getting
Institutions Right’, [2004], http://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/guestci/download/CESifo+DICE+Report+2004/
CESifo+DICE+Report+2/2004/dicereport204-forum2.pdf [accessed April 23 2013]. Very different institutional
systems can also receive high ratings on different indexes. Even a legal system based on private property is not
necessary for high ratings (e.g., China seems to do pretty well on some ratings). Some commentators argue against
having a single formula for aid disbursement at all - context matters, there is no one-size fits all approach. Perhaps
we should look for contingent correlations between local economic conditions and success (Rodrik [2004], p. 9). Still,
there should be a point to saying ‘institutions rule’.
27	IDA (2004), p. 6; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth’, American Economic Review, 90/4
(2000), 847-68; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence’, World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 2834 (2004); David Dollar and Victoria Levin, ‘Increasing selectivity of foreign aid,
1984-2002’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3299 (2004); Paul Collier and David Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation
and Poverty Reduction’, European Economic Review 46/8 (2002), 1475-500.
28	Burnside and Dollar (2000). This research was also picked up by the World Bank report by David Dollar and Lant
Pritchett, ‘Assessing Aid- What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why’, (1998), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/1998/11/438890/assessing-aid-works-doesnt (accessed 5 June 2013) and Collier and Dollar (2002) have taken
on leadership roles within the Bank’s research department, greatly influencing public opinion and probably economic
policy (William Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’, World Development 37/1
[2009], 26-35).
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Collier and Dollar and Burnside and Dollar extended this work using other
measures of institutional quality including the CPIA index.29
Unfortunately, the Burnside and Dollar study has been roundly criticized, and its
successors suffer from many of the same problems.30 These problems undermine
the evidence that distributing aid to countries on the basis of institutional quality
is an effective way to increase growth rates. Many researchers have had trouble
replicating the results in Burnside and Dollar’s study and its successors.31 The
results are, at least, quite fragile; they depend greatly on the particular theoretical
assumptions (model specification) and data used.32 The studies at issue may well
have endogeniety problems and aid may not have a linear relationship to growth
(though the studies suppose otherwise).33 Some of the studies depend on a few
crucial (country and year) observations.34
Some researchers also question the general thesis that aid is more effective
in good institutional environments. Some suggest that good institutions are not
a precondition for aid to work, though good institutions increase aid’s impact
on growth.35 Others argue that features of countries besides their institutional
quality, like climate, may explain why aid works in some places but not others.36
Some even find that good institutions may hinder aid’s effectiveness.37
Both Burnside and Dollar and Dollar and Levin try to defend the evidence in
favor of aiding countries with good institutions.38 They point out that ‘common to
many of these criticisms is a change in specification, either in terms of estimation
technique, or in terms of which variables are included in the regression’.39 But
one complaint about Burnside, Dollar, and Levin’s studies was precisely that
29	Collier and Dollar (2002) and Craig Burnside and David Dollar, ‘Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence’,
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2834 (2004). There are many worries about this and the other
measures of institutional quality researchers use, but this paper will set aside any problems with the measures of
institutional quality in the studies for now. For discussion of the CPIA index, in particular, see Hassoun (2012b).
30	Robert Lensink and Howard White, ‘Are There Negative Returns to Aid?’, (1999), http://som.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/
reports/1995-1999/themeE/1999/99E60/99e60.pdf (accessed 20 July 2013); Carl-Johan Dalgaard and Henrik
Hansen, ‘On Aid, Growth, and Good Policies’, CREDIT Research Paper 00/17 (2000), http://www.iese.ac.mz/lib/
saber/ead_53.pdf (accessed 17 June 2013); Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp, ‘On The Empirics of
Foreign Aid and Growth’, The Economic Journal 114 (2004), 191-216.
31	Lensink and White (1999); Shuans Lu and Rati Ram, ‘Foreign Aid, Government Policies, and Economic Growth:
Further Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data for 1970-1993’, International Economics 54/1 (2001), 15-29.
32	Lu and Ram (2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
33	Deaton (2009); Dalgaard and Hansen (2000); Channing Arndt, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp, ‘Aid and Growth’, UNUWIDER Discussion Paper 2009/05 (2009).
34	William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, ‘New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting “Aid, Policies, and Growth”’,
Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 26, www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2764_file_cgd_
wp026.pdf (accessed 17 August 2013).
35	Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
36	Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004).
37 Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
38 Ibid.
39 Dollar and Levin (2004), p. 2; Burnside and Dollar (2004), p. 6.
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they use the wrong theoretical specification. As to data sources, Dollar and Levin
admit that it was, for a long time, literally impossible for other researchers to
access their data.40 What Dollar et al. do not mention is that this is because the
World Bank’s research department, in which Dollar and Collier have both taken
leadership positions, had not released it. Furthermore, even when researchers
were eventually given access to the original data, they were unable to replicate the
results.41 So there is little reason to believe these studies’ conclusions.
An equally important critique, however, is that the main studies supporting
Burnside and Dollar’s results use GDP per capita as a measure of poverty. At
best there is a large gap between the studies’ results and the claim that a metric
for allocating aid that makes aid conditional on good institutional quality is
justified because it reduces poverty. Consider Dollar and Collier’s argument that
increasing the weight given to poorer countries in the IDA’s formula will reduce
aid’s effectiveness in ameliorating poverty. They suggest that the ‘poverty efficient’
allocation of aid rises with GNI per capita to about $800 in part because relatively
richer poor countries are better able to absorb aid.42 However, to estimate the
‘poverty efficient’ allocation, the authors of this study – Paul Collier and David
Dollar – assume that growth will reduce poverty by a certain amount and that
there is a set budget for reducing poverty. Neither of these claims is well justified.
They simply assume, for instance, that the effect of aid is distributionally neutral
and then adopt an estimate of the poverty elasticity of growth given mean income
based on a few research papers.43 The papers they rely upon look at the general
impact of growth on poverty, however, not on the impact of aid-induced growth
on poverty which, as noted above, may be a quite different matter. Although the
debate will surely continue, the evidence that making aid to countries conditional
on their having good institutions will better reduce poverty is not compelling.
Conclusion
This paper provided a critical introduction to some of the literature on institutional
quality and international development. It looked, in particular, at an argument
for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality
will promote development by reducing poverty. It suggested that there is little
evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor. Even if institutional
quality turns out to be an important determinant of aid’s efficacy, however, many
other things besides good institutions may contribute to aid’s ability to reduce
poverty.44 Moreover, even though it would be incredibly surprising if good
40 Dollar and Levin (2004).
41 Dalgaard and Hansen (2000).
42 Collier and Dollar (2002).
43 Ibid., pp. 17-8.
44	For instance, see Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew Mellinger, and John Gallup, ‘The Geography of Poverty and Wealth’, Scientific
American 284 (2001), 70-5.
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institutions – under some definition – were not important for good development,
there are strong arguments that other things matter as well. So the take-home
lesson is not that good institutions do not matter – but just that we need to think
carefully about how we can better make the case that they matter. We should also
look closely at the ways that good institutions do and do not matter in trying to
promote international development.
More generally, this paper aimed to illustrate a new way that philosophers
might contribute to the philosophy of economics. Philosophers of economics
have so far focused on the foundations of welfare economics – evaluating the
coherence and plausibility of the assumptions underlying much theoretical work
in the discipline. There are, however, many important discussions in economics’
sub-disciplines, including development economics, to which philosophers can
fruitfully contribute.45

Prof. Nicole Hassoun
Department of Philosophy
Binghamton University
email: nhassoun@binghamton.edu

45	This paper draws largely on my paper ‘World Bank Rules for Aid Allocation’ presented at the AMINTAPHIL conference
on economic justice and subsequently published in their conference proceedings. I would like to thank the editors for
permission to publish a revised version of the paper here as well as those who kindly provided comments on drafts of
that paper.
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Appendix: The IDA’s Formula for Aid Allocation and the CPIA Index
Very roughly,46 the IDA’s Formula for Aid Allocation is this:
f (PR2.0, GNIPC-0.125)
GNIPC stands for Gross National Product Per Capita. The IDA gives less weight to
GNIPC as it rises so that each increment of income yields less aid.47 PR stands for
Performance Rating and the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index
(CPIA) makes up 80% of the PR. The Annual Review of Portfolio Performance
(ARPP), the Bank’s rating of projects in a country, makes up the remaining
20%.48 This sum is then scaled by a measure of countries’ governance quality.
This measure is taken from the six governance criteria in the CPIA and one in the
ARPP (weighted equally, divided by 3.549 and raised to the power of 1.5). In effect,
governance gets a lot of weight in the formula. There are also many exceptions.50
Although the exact formula changes over time, the IDA14 formula was:
Allocation Country i (3-year) = SDR3.3 million + Performance-Based Allocation
i (PBA i) where:
(IDA rating i)2 x Population i x (GNI/cap i)-.125

x Envelope
Σ i =1-81 [(IDA rating i)2 x Population i x (GNI/cap i)-.125]
(i) IDA Rating Country i =( 0.8 x CPIA i + 0.2 x ARPP i) x Govfact i

PBA i =

(ii) 	Governance Factor i = (average rating of 6 governance criteria
i / 3.5)1.5
(iii)	The Envelope = IDA three-year envelope, after deduction of the
otherwise determined blend allocations as well as the allocations
to eligible post-conflict countries
(iv) 	The country allocation norm is subject to a maximum of $20 per
capita per annum. 51
46	The IDA’s formula continues to evolve over time. See, for instance, IDA, ‘IDA 15: IDA’s Performance Based Allocation’,
(2007a),     www.siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/34928661172527584498/PBAformula.pdf (accessed 19 July 2013); IDA, ‘IDA 15: Selectivity and Performance’, (2007b), www.
siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/3492866-1172527584498/
PBAEffectiveness.pdf (accessed 23 July 2013).
47 Kanbur (2005), p. 11.
48	Jeff Powell, ‘The World Bank Policy Scorecard: The New Conditionality?’ Bretton Woods Project, (2004), www.
brettonwoodsproject.org/2004/11/art-84455/ (accessed 26 September 2013).
49	CPIA scores for each criteria are between 1 (low) and 6 (high), 3.5 is the mid-point.
50	Post-conflict countries get some precedence for IDA assistance but this is not reflected in the formula itself. Since
there is a cap on how much aid countries can receive, there is also a bias in favor of small countries not reflected in
the formula. A few years ago the Bank reported that ‘sixty-two percent of IDA 14 resources will be allocated using
the formula; another 14 percent go to the capped wealthier countries (India, Indonesia and Pakistan); 10 percent go
to post-conflict countries and 8 percent go to “special purposes” agreed during the replenishment process’ (Bretton
Woods Project, ‘The IDA replenishment’, [2007], www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-552223 [accessed 5 June 2013]).
The fact that small countries get more than their proportionate share of assistance (Tarp [2006], p. 26) should
probably be questioned, though this paper will not take on this task.
51 IDA (2004).
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The CPIA index is based on a questionnaire filled out by World Bank personnel.
It contains 16 indicators in four equally weighted groups – structural policies,
economic management, public management and institutions, and social
inclusion/equity policies. CPIA scores for each criteria are between 1 (low) and
6 (high).
To come up with the ratings, evaluators rate a small number of countries in each
region and provide narrative guidelines to country staff who then rate countries
on each criterion. The scores are modified by the chief economists in the region.
Sector experts review the new scores, and modifications are reviewed by the chief
economists again. An arbitration panel resolves disputes. Below are the CPIA
Index Rating Categories.
A. Economic management
1. Monetary and exchange rate policy
2. Fiscal policy
3. Debt policy
B. Structural policies
4. Trade
5. Financial sector
6. Business environment
C. Policies for social inclusion
7. Gender
8. Equity of public resource use
9. Building human resources
10. Social protection and labor
11. Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability
D. Public sector management and institutions
12. Property rights and rule-based governance
13. Quality of budgetary and financial management
14. Efficiency and equity of revenue mobilization
15. Quality of public administration
16. Transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector52
Here is some further information about CPIA ‘governance criteria’ which receive
a good deal of weight in the World Bank’s analysis of countries’ institutional
quality:
Property rights and rules-based governance: a good score requires,
inter alia, that property rights be protected in ‘practice as well as
52 Excerpted from Powell (2004), Box 1.
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theory’; laws and regulations affecting businesses are ‘transparent and
uniformly applied’; obtaining licences is a small share of the cost of
doing business; police force functions well and is accountable.
Quality of budgetary and financial management: assesses extent
to which budget is linked to policy priorities in national strategies;
effective financial management; timely and accurate fiscal reporting;
and clear and balanced assignment of expenditures and revenues to
each level of government.
Efficiency of revenue mobilization: a good score requires that ‘bulk
of revenues’ be generated from ‘low-distortion’ taxes such as sales/
VAT, property, etc.; low import tariffs; tax base is free from arbitrary
exemptions.
Quality of public administration: assesses ‘policy coordination and
responsiveness, service delivery and operational efficiency, merit and
ethics, and pay adequacy and management of the wage bill’.
Transparency, accountability and corruption: a good score requires
accountability reinforced by audits, inspections and adverse publicity
for performance failures; an independent, impartial judiciary; conflict
of interest and ethics rules for public servants.53

53 Excerpted from ibid., Box 2.
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